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Tennessee v. Lane
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tennessee v. Lane (2004)
upheld the constitutionality oflawsuits by disabled citizens
under Title II of the 1990 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
(ADA) to enforce the fundamental right of ACCESS to courts.
George Lane and Beverly jones, paraplegic WHEELCHAIR
users, together brought suit against the state of Tennessee
and a number of its counties, alleging past and ongoing violations of their respective Title II rights to physically access
that state's court system. An attorney, Lane was compelled
to crawl up flights of stairs to answer criminal charges in a
courtroom located on the second floor of a courthouse with-

out an elevator. When he refused to either crawl or be carried
up those stairs for a subsequent hearing, Lane was arrested
and jailed for his failure to appear. jones, a certified court
reporter, asserted that she could not phYSically access several county courthouses, in consequence of which she had
lost work opportunities and also been excluded from participating in the judiCial process. They collectively requested
monetary damages and injunctive relief. Tennessee sought to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the Eleventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution barred the action due
to sovereign immunity (a legal concept meaning that a government cannot be sued unless it grants permission to be
sued). The federal district court denied Tennessee's motion,
a court of appeals panel affirmed that decision, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari (a writ from a higher court
to a lower one) to hear the case.
The Court was strongly divided, with a bare 5-4 majority
issuing an equally narrow opinion in favor of Lane and jones.
Writing for the majority, justice john Paul Stevens held that
Congress had validly exercised its enforcement power under

896

Terman, Lewis

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated
Tennessee's sovereign immunity and permitted private monetary actions under ADA Title II to enforce access to court
services. The Court reached this conclusion after finding that
"congruence and proportionality" existed between the harm
that was avoided or remedied and the means employed to
achieve that end. Justice Stevens noted evidence presented
before Congress while deliberating the ADA that some threequarters of public services and programs, including access
to courts located in state-owned buildings were inaccessible
to people with disabilities. He cautioned, however, that Title
II only required states to make reasonable modifications on
behalf of qualified individuals with disabilities to existing
programs and services. Such alterations, which could not
fundamentally alter the nature of services, did not require
states "to employ any and all means to make judicial services
accessible to persons with disabilities:'
In addition to the majority ruling, the Court issued two
separate concurring opinions and three separate dissenting opinions. Most notable was the dissent written by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist equating the case to GARRETT V.
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (2001). That decision, for which
he wrote the 5-4 majority opinion. ruled that states were
possessed of sovereign immunity from monetary claims for
ADA employment-related violations because the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated a pattern of employment-related constitutional violations by states. In Tennessee v. Lane, the chief
justice was similarly unpersuaded that individuals with disabilities were systemically excluded by states from accessing
court services and therefore argued that their ADA claims
were likewise barred.
Although ostensibly a victory for people with disabilities
(as well as for those who disagreed with the Rehnquist Court's
federalism line of cases), the majority decision in Tennessee
v. Lane was the by-product of a fractured Court and limited
in scope. Despite the ADXs prohibition against excluding
people with disabilities from the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, the Court confined
its holding to the rights of two individuals to access courts.
Moreover, Justice Stevens did not elaborate on what might
involve access to courts. For instance, it is unclear whether
the ruling extends to sign language interpretation, BRAILLE
transcription, or sound-amplifying infrared hearing loops
for parties, witnesses, or jurors. The majority ruling likewise
left open the question of whether people with disabilities can
gain monetary relief under Title II when denied access to
other state facilities, programs, and services. Consequently,
although Tennessee v. Lane was a victory for disability rights
advocates, its Significance as a precedent for ADA Title II
claims is unclear.
Martha A. Field
Michael Ashley Stein

Further Reading:
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 US.C. §12101 (2000).
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 US.
356 (2001).

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 US. 509 (2004).

